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Chapter 10 – A new British Act and the 
Spicer Committee 
 
After the Gregory Report 
The continuing battle over televised sport 
After publication of the Gregory Report in 1952 until the passing  
of the new British Copyright Act in 1956, the question of televised  
sport continued to occupy the headlines and the attention of  
copyright policymakers. Even in 1951, the Gregory Committee  
could not fail to notice the overwhelming importance of sport to  
television programmers.  
Television began infiltrating the national consciousness in the 1930s 
and by the early 1950s millions had seen at least one sporting broadcast. 
The BBC first televised Wimbledon in 1937, the FA Cup Final in 1938, 
and the Olympics in 1948. In the space of a week in June 1952, the 
BBC broadcast Wimbledon, Test cricket, golf and the Olympic trials. In 
1953, the Coronation, which attracted more television watchers than 
radio listeners, and the Cup Final (one of the greatest in football’s 
history) both transfixed the nation.  
The report recognised that the sports associations controlled something 
of great value. After its publication, most observers accepted that, short 
of government legal intervention, the sports promoters could stymie 
the development of television broadcasting. And as the public 
witnessed over the next four years, if promoters withheld consent to 
the televising of sporting events, the BBC could do nothing. Whenever 
the promoters refused to allow the BBC to bring its cameras to 
sporting venues, the public went without televised sport. 
The promoters first really flexed their muscles in 1952 by imposing a 
partial ban on broadcasting, though they permitted the televising of 
most major sporting events. The ban caused howls of outrage in some 
quarters but the ban served its purpose by reinforcing the key point: 
promoters wielded the whip hand in negotiations with the BBC. They 
decided that though the Gregory Committee refused to support their 
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bid for copyright protection, they would achieve their goals by gambit 
and bargaining.  
Through lobbying and public pronouncements, they continued to 
influence the thinking of the politicians. In 1952, a year after the 
publication of the Committee’s report, the new Sports Promoters’ 
Association announced talks with the BBC. The talks, and the 
associations’ partial ban on televising sporting events, eventually caused 
a ripple through the House of Lords.  
The Earl De La Warr, who as Postmaster General managed the 
Conservative Government’s broadcasting policy, promised to 
encourage the parties to compromise. As he told the Lords, he was 
“trying to bring the various parties together to attempt to persuade 
them to make some special arrangements during coronation year.” 
None of his listeners directly criticised the Government, but several 
expressed concern about the effect of the television ban. “Millions of 
people,” Lord Morrison said to the other peers, “are interested to know 
why they cannot see national sporting events on television.” Lord 
Brabazon agreed. He said: “there is an absolute impasse and unless 
something is done television entertainment is bound to degenerate 
badly.” Brabazon viewed the issue in pragmatic terms. He said: “it is a 
question of arranging hard business facts between promoters of sports 
and televisers.” Lord Howe took a more radical – or regressive – view 
of the best way to end the impasse. He suggested that, “if copyright 
could be conceded a reasonable compromise could be reached between 
sporting interests and the BBC and, probably, the film world.”  
In 1953, after a few months of talks, Lord Lucas told the peers that 
there “was no friction between the BBC and the sporting promoters, 
who have their rights in the matter.” Like Brabazon he adopted a 
practical tone, expressing sympathy for the positions of the sporting 
associations. “National sport in this country,” he said, “is big business, 
with considerable capital investment, and these interests have to be 
looked after.” Though the BBC found itself pressed for funds, the 
sports promoters were entitled to claim a proper commercial rate of 
payment for permitting broadcasts. But the Government could not 
force solutions on the promoters: there would “have to be a voluntary 
arrangement between the corporation and the promoters.”  
Negotiations dragged on for another three years. Finally, the 
Government stepped in. The public demanded sport, the BBC would 
not meet the financial demands of the sports associations, and the 
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sports promoters made clear that money must be found if sport were 
to be televised. So the Government issued a second television 
broadcasting licence in 1955 to a commercial television station, the 
Independent Television Authority (ITV). The beginning of the age of 
commercial television presaged by a few years the era of rich television 
deals between sporting associations and broadcasters. 
Controversy did not end with the issue of a new licence. Many 
promoters still wanted copyright in the broadcasting of events and they 
united in their protests over the 1956 Copyright Bill. Mirabel Topham, 
the Chairman of Topham’s Ltd, and the most powerful woman in 
British racing, led the protests. She called the Bill “unjust and 
dangerous to sports promoters.” Her company leased the Aintree 
racecourse, home of the Grand National, and to highlight the value of 
television rights, Topham banned cameras from filming the 1956 race. 1 
She acknowledged that she acted for political reasons. She intended to 
persuade Parliament to amend the Bill “to give racecourse executives 
proper control of their events.”  
Topham’s action gained her national unpopularity but she made clear 
to politicians and the nation that the wishes of the controllers of 
professional sport in Britain must not be lightly disregarded. If the 
Government settled television broadcasting policy in favour of the 
television licensees, it also acknowledged the private rights and 
expectations of the sporting associations. The battle over sports 
broadcasting demonstrated how in a few years the complexion of 
debate about copyright regulation changed almost beyond recognition. 
Authors’ rights, though still accorded the highest status in the world of 
copyright law-making, no longer dominated regulatory calculations. 
Now the big questions of industry dominated policy thinking.  
Effect of the Gregory Report 
In total, the Gregory Report proved a profoundly important document. 
It provided the basis for the rewriting of British copyright legislation, 
and, in paragraph after paragraph, attended to questions about the 
neighbouring rights of sound recording, broadcasting and public 
performance. It should not be forgotten that without the battles over 
                                                     
1 To the chagrin of broadcasters. A BBC official said of the Aintree ban: “We 
made, with the Independent Television Authority, what we considered was a fair 
and reasonable offer. We are naturally disappointed that Mrs Topham has been 
unable to see her way to accept it.” (The Times, 9 February 1956).  
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broadcasting policy, the formation of the Gregory Committee, or a 
committee like it, may have waited many years.  
Without the efforts of the sports promoters, Harold Wilson’s 20 month 
delay in organising the Gregory Committee may have stretched into 
years. If the sports associations did not press their case so urgently, the 
Committee may have accepted less readily arguments that assumed 
parity between the claims of authors and industries. Its members may 
not have formed so clear a picture of television’s revolutionary effect 
on social and economic life. In one sense, the sporting associations, and 
not the BBC, made the case for broadcast copyright.  
The report pointed to the road ahead. Four years after its publication, 
the new British Copyright Act established a new general category of 
analogous copyrights – that is, copyright in ‘subject matter other than 
works’. In 1968, new Australian legislation adopted the same categories. 
The report is therefore a precursor of a new age and new realities. 
Within a few years of its publication, government regulators devoted 
most of their attention to accommodating the needs of the copyright 
industries, the producers, distributors and broadcasters of records, 
films and television content. Soon enough, they began adapting also to 
the requirements of the newest and greatest of the copyright industries 
– the software industry.  
The Spicer Committee 
A narrow inquiry 
The Menzies Liberal Coalition Government, closely watching events in 
Britain, first proposed to hold an inquiry into copyright law reform in 
the mid 1950s. The Governor General announced a copyright inquiry 
in 1954, only two years after publication of the Gregory Report.2 But 
the Government delayed the inquiry for four years, deciding to wait 
until the British Parliament digested the Gregory Report and passed a 
new Act. Australia evidently decide to watch Britain create precedents 
and then adopt British solutions.  
The policy of the Government is clear from the Spicer Committee’s 
terms of reference which plainly asked the Committee to “advise which 
                                                     
2 After the Liberal Coalition retained office in the election of May 1954, the 
Governor General announced the Government’s official political program and 
referred to a proposed copyright inquiry. 
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of the amendments recently made in the law of copyright in the United 
Kingdom should be incorporated into the Australian copyright law.” 
John Spicer and his colleagues were to translate the British Copyright 
Act of 1956 into Australian law, not to waste time devising original 
solutions to problems of copyright regulation.  
The letter of appointment sent to each Committee member left no 
room for doubt. The pro forma issued by Neil O’Sullivan, the federal 
Attorney General said: 
The subject of the inquiry could easily give rise to investigations both widespread and 
prolonged. The relation between the Australian law and the United Kingdom law 
however has always been so close, and the matter has been so comprehensively and so 
recently reviewed in the United Kingdom, that I have found it possible to draw terms 
of reference … which will, I hope, enable the committee not only to concentrate its 
attention on the material available as a result of the review made in the United 
Kingdom, but also to obtain from interested persons and bodies written submissions 
directed specifically to the provisions adopted in the new United Kingdom Act rather 
than covering the whole subject at large. 
Dominated by the two judges, Spicer and Dean, the Committee could 
be trusted to implement O’Sullivan’s instructions rigorously and 
narrowly. Spicer and Dean would not embarrass the Government by, 
for example, inquiring into the policy on import controls. Their 
dominance of their colleagues, a solicitor, a bookseller and a clerical 
professor of music, ensured that the Committee rarely departed from 
the track cut out of hard ground by the Gregory Committee.  
All the Committee members seemed to share the view that legal rules 
subsist in a hermetic environment of their own, unrelated to an outside 
world in which monopoly and predatory pricing are viewed as social 
evils. Their report never explained the policy underlying legal rules. It 
took as self-evident the principles and propositions enunciated in 
legislation and the Gregory Report. Thus the Committee failed to 
grapple with the question of parallel importation restrictions, a 
distinctly Australian problem about which the Gregory Committee said 
nothing – not surprisingly, since Britain benefited from the restrictions.  
Its members seemed unable to look beyond legal precedent and 
principle to justify conclusions reached. But, like their British 
counterparts, they readily adopted pragmatic rationales for supporting 
the retention or creation of rights, even if they doubted that some 
rights could be supported in principle. The Committee manifested its 
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preference for pragmatism over principle in outlining reasons for 
retaining the compulsory recording licence. It said in its report:  
History perhaps more than logic plays its part in the development of ideas and in 
this case we think historical considerations coupled with practical realities lead to the 
conclusion that law should not be changed.  
Conformism 
Handicapped by the narrow conceptual outlook of its members, the 
Spicer Committee did its job efficiently, according to the lights of legal 
analysis. But members seemed to have no interest in identifying the 
social objectives of copyright regulation, nor considering whether 
copyright law achieved these objectives, nor how such objectives might 
best be realised in the future. As a result, their report betrayed little 
knowledge of the crucial social, historical and economic questions 
relevant to copyright policy. 
The limitations of narrow analysis were particularly evident in 
discussion of the posthumous term. Unlike the members of Canadian 
and New Zealand copyright inquiries,3 the members of the Spicer 
Committee could not bring themselves to consider proposing a shorter 
copyright term. They looked with seeming distaste on the willingness of 
their New Zealand and Canadian counterparts to contemplate the 
possibility of their countries standing outside the Berne Union.  
The New Zealanders and Canadians argued that long periods of 
copyright subsistence benefited the economies of countries that 
exported large amounts of copyright material. Countries that imported 
copyright material, on the other hand, should welcome shorter periods, 
since expired copyright meant, in theory, free access to material. They 
recommended against ratification of the Convention amendments 
agreed at the Brussels Conference in 1948.  
The Australian committee would not dream of proposing so radical a 
step. According to its report, principles of reciprocity and uniformity 
demanded that Australia remain within the Union. The report 
acknowledged that “justice to overseas authors” and ensuring that 
Australian creators received the same benefits overseas that foreign 
creators enjoyed in Australia took priority over “our economic 
interests” as “primarily a user country”. The Gregory Committee, on 
                                                     
3 The Canadian Royal Commission reported in 1957 and the New Zealand 
Copyright Committee 1959. 
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the other hand, intimated that if unconstrained by the terms of the 
amended Berne Convention, it would have recommended that 
copyright run for a period of 25 to 50 years from the first publication 
of a work.  
The Spicer Committee’s arguments about the posthumous term 
demonstrated dialectical narrowness, not questionable judgment. If the 
necessity for international uniformity is taken as a premise of copyright 
policymaking, the decision to support retention of the 50 year term 
could hardly be gainsaid. But the Committee failed intellectually in its 
examination of the import provisions in the copyright legislation. Their 
origins could be traced to the Statute of Anne, and since the 19th 
century they had enabled British publishers to control the supply of 
books to Britain’s overseas possessions. Politicians in both Houses of 
the Australian Parliament attacked import provisions in the 1912 
Copyright Bill to no avail.  
Given the chequered legislative history of the provisions, and the fact 
that the Berne Convention left the determination of import rules to the 
discretion of its members, the Spicer Committee could reasonably have 
examined the merits of the monopoly. Yet it failed to take the 
opportunity and in fact made no reference whatsoever to the history of 
the provisions and their effect on the price and range of imports.  
So far as can be discerned, the Australian committee considered that 
long usage and international consensus validated the law on the 
posthumous term and the import monopoly. Members seemed to see 
no reason to look deeper into the history of the relevant provisions,  
to find no cause for further inquiry. Australia, they seemed to think, 
should remain faithful to time-honoured norms and disregard 
suggestions that some legal rules of long standing did not benefit  
the nation. 
Deficiencies of analysis 
When the two committees’ reports are compared, the Australian 
document seems more pedestrian in its analysis. The Australian 
discussion of the posthumous 50 year term is superficial when 
compared to that of the British committee. The Gregory Committee 
heard with interest arguments by the eminent economist Arnold Plant 
in favour of substantial reduction in the period of copyright. Spicer and 
his colleagues wasted no time on the esoteric question of whether so 
long a period of protection could be justified in principle.  
 
286 
Commenting on the Canadian and New Zealand recommendations for 
a copyright term of 56 years from first publication or the life of the 
author, they said in their report that they could “see no particular 
virtue” in the reduced period of protection. Why, they did not explain. 
Instead, they deflected the argument. The report said:  
We feel that the onus of showing that such a substantial alteration of our present 
law is desirable should be on the person advocating it. No-one has made a 
submission specifically urging us to recommend that Australia should not ratify the 
Brussels Convention. 
This statement, suggesting dislike of speculative inquiry, forewarned the 
reader that the Committee would rely heavily on precedent to 
determine its conclusions. In the case of copyright law, reasoning from 
precedent can produce unintended results. The Spicer Committee’s 
unwillingness to question established practice meant that it 
misunderstood the power of vested interest in the creation of copyright 
law and supported or proposed some rules that were inimical to the 
interests of the Australian public.  
Chief among these were the legislative provisions that created the 
import monopoly and the lengthy posthumous term. If treaty 
obligation militated against reconsideration of the lengthy term, nothing 
prevented the Committee from attacking the import monopoly. 
Nothing, that is, except vested interest and established practice, and the 
Spicer Committee showed little willingness to question either. 
The Committee’s conservatism seemed to induce a kind of intellectual 
paralysis. It appeared beyond the imaginations of its members to even 
consider adopting the course taken by its New Zealand and Canadian 
counterparts, both of which, as the Committee acknowledged, “were 
greatly influenced by the fact that their countries were largely users of 
copyright material.” 
The approach of the Spicer Committee, conservative, cautious and 
legalist, is exemplified in its justification it gave for recommending that 
Australia retain the 50 year posthumous term. Its report declared: 
As Australia is primarily a user country and is likely to remain that way for some 
time, it might, of course, be in our economic interests to make the term of protection 
as short as possible. Factors other than the balance of payments are, however, 
involved, such as justice to overseas authors, the benefits of whose works Australians 
enjoy. We also mention that literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works of 
Australian origin are growing and receiving increasing recognition abroad. The 
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United Kingdom will, we think, remain one of the main users of Australian 
copyright material and we are of the view that our authors should in that country be 
entitled to the same copyright protection as British authors. This can only be ensured 
by granting in Australia reciprocal benefits to British authors. 
What is striking about this statement is that it acknowledges the cost  
to Australia of uniformity without taking the next step of exploring  
that cost. While the importance of reciprocity in international  
copyright relations is undeniable, reciprocity for a “user country” like 
Australia is purchased at a price. The Spicer Committee declined to 
discuss whether the benefit justified the price. Reciprocity and 
uniformity are safeguards against the cost and loneliness of isolation. 
But acceptance of norms that greatly advantage the interests of 
copyright owners means access limitations in the form of high prices 
and restricted supply.  
In principle, a short period of copyright protection benefits the user 
country. It means earlier access to material, such as cheap editions of 
books, when the copyright expires. The Spicer Committee knew that a 
shorter term, if accepted internationally, would be, in principle, “in our 
economic interests” and likely to improve the “balance of payments”. It 
also knew that reality contradicted theory because the international 
copyright community would not have accepted Australian legislation 
creating a shorter term.  
Even so, the Spicer Committee’s unwillingness to consider the 
consequences of unswerving loyalty to treaty norms showed a 
deficiency of imagination that continues to infect copyright policy-
making in Australia. What the Committee failed to acknowledge, as it 
could have done, is that by endorsing the 50 year posthumous term, it 
placed pragmatic considerations of “justice to the overseas authors” 
and “reciprocal benefits to British authors” ahead of the – admittedly 
theoretical – Australian national interest. To raise these considerations 
as reasons for not exploring the arguments for a reduced term showed 
an inability to appreciate the economic and social dimension of 
copyright policy.  
The Committee’s treatment of import controls suggested that its 
members were oblivious to the issues raised in the parliamentary  
debate over the copyright legislation of 1912. Their indifference to the 
effect of the “big blackmailing clause” as John Keating called  
section 10 of the 1912 Act would doubtless have aggravated Keating 
and his fellow opponents of the import monopoly, Vardon and 
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Gordon, had they been alive. But they were not, and no-one pointed 
out to the Committee members that these politicians once attacked 
import controls. 
Blind to the history and function of the import monopoly, the 
Committee members recommended adoption of a provision 
substantially similar to the importing clause in the new British Act, 
concentrating their efforts on devising modifications that would 
facilitate the copyright owner’s enforcement of rights.  
They placed the onus on the importer, seller or dealer to prove lack of 
knowledge and the absence of reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
the making or importation of a work took place without the owner’s 
consent. Changes were made to clarify the owner’s right and to remove 
the possibility of a person relying on ambiguous language to evade 
liability for breach of the section. 
Then the ship sailed on. Questions of the national interest, dear to the 
hearts of Keating, Vardon and Gordon, vanished overboard. The 
Committee followed the course charted by the Gregory Committee:  
it accepted the desirability of repeating the substance of the new  
British statute in Australian legislation and recommended various 
changes of arrangement (for example, placing the definitions section at 
the beginning of the Australian Act) and style (removing perceived 
drafting ambiguities). 
Compulsory licence 
The disagreements between APRA and music users were only the first 
of many arguments about the commercial exploitation of copyright in 
Australia. Old animosities centred around the recording industry were 
also extensively replayed before the Spicer Committee. First, the record 
manufacturers and the owners of musical copyright spoke for and 
against the compulsory licence to manufacture records.  
The Copyright Owners Reproduction Society called the compulsory 
licence system arbitrary. CORS told the Committee that the licence 
denied owners the power to bargain freely over the rate of royalty, and 
took from them the power to control the production of inferior 
recordings. Then record companies pressed their claim for the 
mechanical performing right, in the teeth of opposition from radio and 
television broadcasters. 
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The Spicer Committee favoured the recording industry. Its members 
recommended that Australian copyright legislation retain the 
compulsory licence and establish a public performance right in records. 
Like their counterparts on the Gregory Committee, they felt equivocal 
about both rights. Spicer and his colleagues were reluctant to interrupt 
settled practice and they did not wish to void years of legitimate 
investment. They declared themselves, “impressed by the argument that 
there would be some injustice in destroying rights in existence  
after money has been invested.” Yet when it came to justifying the 
rights in principle, the Committee struggled to find reasons to support 
its position. 
The Committee admitted its difficulty in finding a “logical basis” for 
the legislative provision creating the compulsory licence. “No such 
licence,” said its report, “operates in relation to any other form of 
reproduction of copyright material.” This statement, though not strictly 
accurate,4 summed up the Committee’s difficulty. In legislation that 
implemented a Convention dedicated to authors’ rights, the 
compulsory licensing provisions were anomalous.  
Sensibly, perhaps, the Committee chose not to dwell on the theoretical 
failings of the copyright legislation. Its report acknowledged that in 
“the absence of some clear logical basis for such a compulsory licence 
system we would not recommend such a provision” but it added a 
proviso. Long-established practice demanded that the licence be 
retained. When the Committee members made up their minds, they 
decided they could not ignore “the history of the matter and the 
widespread acceptance of the principle”.  
Compulsory licensing could be readily justified as a device to defeat 
monopoly but not, from the perspective of authors’ rights, as an 
invasion of an exclusive right. The Spicer Report lucidly explained  
the theoretical function of compulsory licensing, and reinforced  
the argument by pointing out that anti-trust sentiment inspired  
the introduction of compulsory licensing in the United States in  
1909. But the Committee could not find a “logical” basis for  
section 19 of the 1911 Copyright Act (which established the 
compulsory recording licence).  
However, the report did not explain whether the compulsory licence 
actually functioned to defeat monopoly. The Committee’s support for 
                                                     
4 Section 3 of the 1911 British Copyright Act licensed the reproduction of literary 
works 25 years after the author’s death. 
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its retention on the grounds of longevity is thus mystifying. If the 
licence could only be supported because it had survived for a long time, 
principle surely demanded that it be revoked. The Committee’s 
readiness to support the licence seemed to confirm that in copyright 
policymaking, the principles expounded by the Berne Union were now 
subordinate to economic considerations. 
Seemingly, Spicer and his colleagues believed that the licensing 
provisions were not justified on their merits but should be retained  
to protect an industry. They seemed, in this instance, heedless of 
principle and preoccupied with the needs and expectations of the 
recording industry.  
Mechanical Performing Right 
Twenty-five years after Gramophone Company Ltd v Stephen Cawardine and 
Co, the record companies pressed the Spicer Committee to recommend 
legislative recognition of the mechanical performing right. They 
perhaps took the Committee’s compliance for granted, for they made 
only oral submissions. Their confidence proved justified. The 
Committee reported that the new British Copyright Act recognised a 
mechanical performing right, and proposed that Australian legislation 
follow suit. 
The evidence heard for and against the right reprised the arguments of 
Bonney and Cook, barristers for the record companies and 
broadcasters, before the Owen Royal Commission in the early 1930s. 
The recording industry put its case first. Its representatives stated the 
necessity for the legislature to heed the common law. They insisted that 
Justice Maugham’s decision in Cawardine validated the claim for 
statutory recognition and pointed to the allegedly disastrous effect of 
radio broadcasting on sales in the 1930s.  
The industry introduced one new element to the arguments heard by 
Justice Owen a quarter of a century previously: representatives now 
emphasised the vital relationship between the public performance of 
records and continued industry investment. If, they said, the industry 
could not recoup public performance fees, investment in more 
production would decline and eventually cease. Companies must be 
able to recoup the cost of investing in the production of records.  
Arguing for statutory exclusion, the radio broadcasters were forced to 
try to persuade the Spicer Committee to disregard two powerful 
precedents, namely the decision in Cawardine and the decision of the 
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British legislature to recognise the mechanical performing right. The 
task proved hopeless. Devoted to uniformity and precedent, Spicer and 
his colleagues would not look beyond the principles of common law 
and British legislation.  
The broadcasters pointed out that before the passage of the British 
Copyright Bill in 1956, Opposition Labour peers attacked the judgment 
in Cawardine. Lord Lucas, previously involved in the Lords’ debate on 
sporting copyright, disparaged Maugham’s arguments. Lord Jowitt, an 
outstanding reforming lawyer and former Lord Chancellor, claimed that 
“the extraordinary ingenuity” of Sir Stafford Cripps, counsel for the 
Gramophone Company, “induced” Maugham’s decision. He concluded 
that “it was a great misfortune that the right was ever given.”  
Further, said the radio broadcasters, arguments about investment cut 
no ice. Broadcasting posed no threat to the future of the recording 
industry. Radio stations boosted the popularity of records and indirectly 
poured money into the pockets of record companies. The right of 
public performance logically applied to one subject matter only: an 
original work. The pressing of record involved no originality, though 
the production process could not occur without the application of 
capital investment and expertise. Neither, however, warranted the 
statutory grant of a performance right.  
They begged the Committee to consider that in practice, foreign 
industry would benefit from the mechanical performance right. Most 
records were produced overseas, and public performance fees would 
mostly be distributed to foreign record labels. These labels would 
benefit from the boon of booming retail sales – conferred by radio 
stations on record manufacturers – and the ever-increasing pool of fees 
collected for the public performance of recordings.  
The record companies made no attempt to adduce some species of 
originality in their production activities. Instead, they concentrated on 
those factors that made their work economically valuable: technical 
skill, the selection of artists, marketing and above all financial 
investment. They also insisted that they were entitled to receive 
remuneration for the use of records for a commercial purpose. They 
reminded the Spicer Committee that its British counterpart 
recommended the grant to manufacturers of a public performance 
right. Finally, they drew an analogy with the proposal to recognise a 
performance right in a television broadcast, which the Spicer 
Committee endorsed without demur. 
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Committee’s reasoning 
The Committee remarked that “the question is a very difficult one and 
is one upon which different minds will reach different conclusions.” 
Difficult, certainly, if its members, adopting the language used in their 
analysis of section 19, tried to find a “logical” basis for the creation of a 
mechanical performance right. If they accepted that copyright law 
derived from the principle that subsistence depended on authorial 
originality, then they could not justify recommending copyright 
subsistence in records, or derivative rights, such as the mechanical 
performance right. 
They passed lightly over the problems of theoretical incompatibility and 
logical inconsistency and reached conclusions on pragmatic grounds.  
In so doing, they enlarged the rupture, begun in 1911 with the 
enactment of section 19, between principle and the claims of economic 
necessity. The British and Australian copyright inquiries acknowledged 
that the grand visions of the Berne Union were realisable only  
through the harnessing of industrial processes – recording, filming and 
broadcasting. In no sense would the industries built on these processes 
allow themselves to be controlled by authors. Thus, the ambitions of 
the proponents of authors’ rights made inevitable the grant of 
copyright to industries.  
Politics, expedience and British precedent guided the choices of the 
Spicer Committee. Its members recognised that the political and 
commercial cost of withholding the mechanical performing right would 
likely be too much for any government to countenance. Their report 
stated their position slightly differently but delivered the unmistakable 
message was that policymakers could not afford to disregard the 
commercial expectations of a well-established and profitable industry.  
As the Committee said, “the making of a record involves a considerable 
amount of artistic and technical skill.” The report went on: 
We do not think that the result of another person’s effort and skill should be made 
available to wide audiences by means of broadcasting or public performance without 
any payment being made to that person … We are also impressed by the argument 
that there would have been some injustice in destroying rights in existence after money 
has been invested in making records on the basis of existing law. 
Money invested … the new axiom of copyright law 50 years after the 
pioneering declamations of John Drummond Robertson, spokesman 
for the Gramophone Company. The report disclosed, almost in 
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passing, the truest reason for broadcasters to accept the enactment of a 
mechanical performing right. If broadcasters wanted copyright in 
broadcasts, they should concede to record manufacturers the right to 
control the playing of records. 
The Committee made its recommendation not because the necessity 
for a mechanical performing right could obviously be extrapolated 
from the law of copyright, but rather to facilitate industry regulation 
along the lines sought by industry, not government. The record 
companies wanted the right, the broadcasters could put up with it,  
and most importantly, it was not going to prevent either from  
making money. 
Other findings 
The Committee also followed the British example by recommending 
ratification of the Brussels Convention, the addition of a broadcasting 
right to the primary rights of copyright authors, and a statutory schema 
that established a second category of copyright subject matter 
consisting of sound recordings, cinematograph films and broadcasts. It 
recommended the adoption of the British provisions dealing with 
library copying and copying for educational purposes and fair  
dealing. The report also proposed a new extended Crown copyright  
provision and adoption of the British provisions dealing with 
typographical arrangements. 
Spicer and his colleagues observed the need for a copyright tribunal 
similar to that established in Britain and agreed with the Gregory 
Report that copyright should not subsist in performances or sporting 
spectacles. The term of copyright was to be 50 years from the death of 
the author and in the case of sound recordings and films, 50 years from 
the date of production. The report declared the 25 year rule for books 
redundant and called for the compulsory licence for records to be 
recognised in statute. 
The question of sporting copyright, so central to the politics of 
copyright in Britain, featured hardly at all in the proceedings of the 
Spicer Committee. Only the Victorian Football League made strong 
submissions about copyright in sporting spectacles. In its submission, 
the VFL referred to the 1937 case of Victoria Park Racing and Recreation 
Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor5 as one that determined “that there was no 
                                                     
5 58 CLR 479 
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copyright in a spectacle”. In that case, the High Court held that owners 
of a racecourse could not prevent a company from broadcasting race 
results from a tower overlooking the racecourse.  
The VFL argued, quoting Justice Dixon’s judgment, that “broadcasting 
rights” were “quasi-property”, and referred to section 115 of the 
Broadcasting and Television Act 1942, which prohibited broadcasting of 
sporting events using equipment placed outside the sporting grounds – 
if spectators paid entry fees. The VFL considered section 115 
protection insufficient and asked for sporting copyright to protect the 
investment made by sporting bodies from the commercial depredations 
of radio and television broadcasters.  
But the silence of other sports associations, and, more crucially, 
Britain’s rejection of proposals for sporting copyright, encouraged the 
Committee to reject the VFL’s request. The recognition of broadcast 
copyright in the British legislation set a precedent of which the 
Committee approved. In Australia, as well as Britain, television 
broadcasters would hold copyright in broadcasts but they would need 
to negotiate broadcast rights with the associations that controlled 
sporting grounds and fixtures.  
A copyright tribunal 
The Committee unhesitatingly recommended the formation of an 
Australian copyright tribunal. Perhaps the most interesting part of its 
report is the brief recitation of the history of Australian radio 
broadcasting and the activities of APRA. As the Committee pointed 
out, the problems that led the Gregory Report to recommend 
establishment of a copyright tribunal were experienced most acutely in 
Australia. Ironically, APRA and the radio manufacturers, the opponents 
of a tribunal in the 1930s, now supported the creation of such a body. 
By contrast, the broadcasters, who were the pre-eminent advocates of a 
tribunal 30 years previously, and the cinema exhibitors, now asked for 
the adoption of a more informal system of arbitration. 
The Spicer Report devoted a whole chapter, and over 40 paragraphs to 
the question of the copyright tribunal. The focus on the question of 
performing rights disputes indicated strongly the continuing, and 
growing, importance of performing rights in the copyright economy. 
The archival record only reinforces the impression that the resolution 
of performing rights disputes remained a fundamental preoccupation of 
government and the suppliers and users of music.  
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Evidence of the attention given to performing right questions can be 
gleaned from the Attorney General’s Department records in the 
interwar period. The department maintained at least 47 files on 
different copyright subjects, mostly connected with radio broadcasting 
and the associated performance right. APRA, naturally, loomed large in 
records. The ‘Payment to APRA’ file, documenting ABC payments, 
remained current for 20 years from 1938. The titles of the other files 
chart the course of APRA’s activities during the period: ‘APRA radio 
stations agreement’ (1929); ‘AFBS arbitration with APRA’ (1933); and 
‘APRA v B Class stations’ (1934). Other files indicate the early official 
interest in the question of broadcasting: the first file on ‘copyright 
broadcasting’ was opened in 1925 and it was followed quickly by files 
on copyright charges for music broadcasts (1926) and the conference 
held in Sydney in July 1926 to discuss performance fees. 
In 1943, as the Spicer Report noted, the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on Broadcasting proposed the compulsory arbitration of 
disputes between APRA and the ABC and APRA and commercial 
radio broadcasters. Legislation did not eventuate, but by the time of the 
Spicer Committee’s inquiry in 1959, all interested parties, including 
APRA, agreed on the desirability of compulsory arbitration. As the 
Committee said, not all accepted the need for a permanent tribunal to 
adjudicate disputes. However its report noted that if the principle of 
compulsory arbitration were universally accepted, the creation of a 
quasi-judicial body would produce a necessary uniformity of method 
and lead to the creation of precedents. 
The Committee recommended that the Australian tribunal differ from 
its British counterpart in one respect. It would consist of three 
members, but to avoid the problems faced in Britain of finding sitting 
times convenient for all tribunal members, disputes submitted to the 
Australian body would be heard by one person only – the member in a 
position to hear a dispute at the earliest possible time. 
Differences in approach between the Spicer and 
Gregory Committees 
The attention devoted in the Spicer Report to the questions of 
compulsory licensing and the performing right in records highlighted 
not just the importance attached by government to regulating record 
production and broadcasting. It also revealed a divergence of priorities 
between the governments, and industries, of Britain and Australia. In 
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Australia, unlike Britain, the question of copyright in sporting 
spectacles occupied very little official attention.  
While the Gregory Committee devoted considerable attention to 
discussing the grounds for establishing copyright in individual 
performances and spectacles (as distinct from the performance of a 
record or film) the Spicer Committee, probably wisely, paid little 
attention to the question. Instead, it emphasised the benefits of 
continuing the system of compulsory licensing and allowing record 
manufacturers a right of public performance, questions settled in 
Britain without significant controversy. 
The reasons for the differing approaches to copyright in the two 
countries is not hard to find. The British recording and broadcasting 
markets were more developed than Australia’s, and the strength of the 
British recording industry meant that the compulsory licence and the 
performing right in records were never going to be under threat. 
In Britain, the Government needed to make television broadcasting 
viable. The Australian Government faced smaller challenges. It could 
even have ignored the recording industry and favoured the  
arguments of radio broadcasters. Predictably, however, the legislative 
outcome in Australia turned out to be identical to that in Britain.  
The Spicer Committee never threatened to undermine the long 
tradition of Australian subservience to the copyright prescriptions of 
foreign nations.6 
                                                     
6 See Appendix 3 for the Spicer Committee recommendations. 
